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Abstract
We consider the problem of portfolio risk diversification in a Value-at-Risk framework with
heavy-tailed risks and arbitrary dependence captured by a copula function. We use the power
law for modelling the tails and investigate whether the benefits of diversification persist when
the risks in consideration are allowed to have extremely heavy tails with tail indices less than
one and when their copula describes wide classes of dependence structures. We show that for
asymptotically large losses with the Eyraud-Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern copula, the threshold
value of tail indices at which diversification stops being beneficial is the same as for independent
losses. We further extend this result to a wider range of dependence structures which can be
approximated using power-type copulas and their approximations. This range of dependence
structures includes many well known copula families, among which there are comprehensive,
Archimedian, asymmetric and tail dependent copulas. In other words, diversification increases
Value-at-Risk for tail indices less than one regardless of the nature of dependence between
portfolio components within these classes. A wide set of simulations supports these theoretical
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1 Introduction
Level-q Value-at-Risk VaRq, also known as the level-q quantile of a distribution of losses, is a
commonly used risk measure, whose popularity in a wide range of areas in finance is attributed to
the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A series of recent papers
studied the problem of portfolio optimization in the VaR framework, focusing on the situation when
the portfolio components are independent and have a heavy tailed distribution (see, e.g., Ibragimov
and Walden, 2011; Embrechts et al., 2009). An interesting conclusion from that work is that if tails
are extremely heavy then diversification increases riskiness in terms of VaR.
This theoretical property of VaR known as non-subadditivity or non-coherence is often weighted
against the practical considerations of the ease of calculation and backtesting and smaller data re-
quirements, compared to subadditive risk measures such as Expected Shortfall (see, e.g., Danielsson
et al., 2013; Garcia et al., 2007). Moreover, it is well established in today’s finance that in practice
risks are dependent in some usually unknown fashion and that the behavior of other risk mea-
sures including ES is closely related to the behavior of the tail of sums of dependent risks used
in VaR analysis (see, e.g. Alink et al., 2005). Therefore, a better understanding of when VaR is
non-subadditive in non-iid settings is key to continued use of VaR as a robust risk measure.
The literature on VaR for independent risks is very wide and has a long tradition (see, e.g.,
books by Embrechts et al., 1997; Resnick, 1987). More recently, Garcia et al. (2007); Ibragimov and
Walden (2007); Ibragimov (2009b) focused on the case of iid stable random variable with infinite
variance and showed that VaR is subadditive provided the mean is finite. Similar results were
obtained for asymptotically large losses without the assumption of a stable distribution. However,
extensions to non-independence are more recent and have been limited to specific cases. For exam-
ple, Ibragimov and Walden (2007, 2011) consider dependence arising from common multiplicative
and additive shocks, Embrechts et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2012) consider Archimedian copulas,
Asmussen and Rojas-Nandayapa (2008) consider the normal copula, Albrecher et al. (2006) consider
several copula classes permitting explicit solutions such as Archimedian copulas. An interesting
result arising from these studies is that the subadditivity property of VaR is generally affected by
both the strength of dependence and the tail behavior of the marginals, however in some cases only
heavy tails of the marginals matter.
In this paper, we provide several new results on subadditivity of VaR in non-iid settings. The
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classes of dependence structures we consider are motivated by several widely used copula families
and their approximators. We start with the Eyraud-Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (EFGM) copula
family and show that for power law risks whose tail exponent is below one, diversification is sub-
optimal (ie it increases riskiness) regardless of the value of the dependence parameter provided the
loss is large enough. We proceed by providing similar results on copulas that can be viewed as gen-
eralizations and first or second order approximations of the EFGM copula. This class of copulas,
which we call power-type, includes the power copulas of Ibragimov (2009a), polynomial copulas of
Drouet Mari and Kotz (2001), copulas with cubic sections of Nelsen et al. (1997), as well as a large
number of related copulas with various dependence features such as asymmetry, tail-dependence,
comprehensiveness etc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by introducing the power law
distributions and discussing available results for independent risks. Section 3 reviews the basics
of copulas, introduces the power-type copula class, and presents the main results on limits of
diversification for this class, as well as simulation evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2 Diversification under independence
2.1 Heavy tails and power law family
It has become common in financial econometrics to use the tail index of a distribution to
measure its tails (see, e.g., Embrechts et al., 1997; Gabaix, 2009; Ibragimov, 2009b). The tail index
characterizes the heaviness, or the rate of decay, of the tails of the relevant univariate distribution,
assuming it obeys a power law. The family of distributions obeying the power law of tail decay is
known as the power law family and the law is usually written as follows
P(|X| > x) ∼ x−α, (1)
where α is the tail index, or tail exponent.1
Power law distributions permit modelling rates of tail decay that are slower than the exponential
decay of the Gaussian distribution, which is important in financial applications. Such distributions
1Here, “∼” means that the left hand side is asymptotically equivalent to a nonzero constant times the right hand
side, where asymptotics is as x→∞.
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often form the basis of a wider class obtained by introducing a slight disturbance to the tail behavior
in the form of a slowly varying function (see, e.g., Embrechts et al., 1997; Ibragimov and Walden,
2008). The tail index α governs the likelihood of observing outliers or large fluctuations: a smaller
tail index means slower rate of decay, which means that this likelihood is higher. When the tail
index is less than two, the tail decay is so slow that the second moment of the underlying distribution
is infinite; when the tail index is less than one, the first moment is infinite. More generally, the
power law distributions have the property that absolute moments of X are finite if and only if their
order is less than tail index α. That is,
E|X|p <∞ if p < α; E|X|p =∞ if p ≥ α.
A large number of studies in economics and finance have documented that financial returns
have distributions with values of α ranging from significantly lower than one to above four (Jansen
and Vries, 1991; Loretan and Phillips, 1994; McCulloch, 1997; Rachev and Mittnik, 2000; Gabaix
et al., 2006; Chavez-Demoulin et al., 2006; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007). Many distributions
can be viewed as special cases of power law, at least for asymptotically large losses. This includes
Student t distribution, Cauchy, Levy and Pareto and other Stable distributions with parameter
α < 2. We will say that a risk has extremely heavy tails if α < 1.
2.2 Limits of diversification under heavy tails and independence
Consider a simple problem of optimal portfolio allocation in the VaR framework with two
possibly extremely heavy tails. Let w = (w1, w2) ∈ R2 be the portfolio weights such that w1 +w2 =
1. Let Xj represent a loss, j = 1, 2 which has a power law distribution with index αj . Consider
the tail of the aggregate loss distribution P (w1X1 + w2X2 > x), where the weighted average loss
w1X1 + w2X2 corresponds to a portfolio of two risks with weights w1 and w2. Unless one of
the weights is zero, the portfolio is diversified. A 5%-VaR of this portfolio is the value of loss
x for which that probability is 0.05. More generally, the q% Value-at-Risk of a portfolio Z is
VaRq(z) = inf{z ∈ R : P (Z > z) ≤ q}, or the (1 − q)-th quantile of the loss distribution. The
problem of interest is to minimize VaRq(w1X1 +w2X2) over the weights w for a given q ∈ (0, 1/2).
When X1 and X2 are iid with a stable distribution, it is now well understood that, for all
non-zero w’s, P (w1X1 + w2X2 > x) ≤ P (X1 > x) if αj > 1, j = 1, 2. Equivalently, the VaR
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of a diversified portfolio VaRq (w1X1 + w2X2 > x) is no greater than that of a not diversified,
VaRq (X1 > x), if αj > 1. In order words, diversification helps lower the VaR for moderately, but
not extremely, heavy tailed risks. If αi < 1 then P (w1X1 + w2X2 > x) ≥ P (X1 > x); that is, for
extremely heavy-tailed risks the benefits of diversification disappear and the least risky portfolio has
just one risk. For example, if Xj ’s are iid Stable with α = 1/2, that is if they are Levy distributed,
the aggregate loss of an equally weighted portfolio X1+X22 has the same distribution as 2X1 and
thus VaRq
(
X1+X2
2
)
= 2VaRq(X1) > VaRq(X1).
Analogous statements hold for portfolios of any size and asymptotically (for infinitely large
losses) even if the distribution of X is not stable. Ibragimov (2009b) showed this in a general context
with any number of risks, using majorization theory. Similar results are available for bounded risks
concentrated on a sufficiently large interval: for such cases, VaR-based diversification is suboptimal
up to a certain number of risks and then becomes optimal (Ibragimov and Walden, 2007).
There is a growing range of empirical applications of these seemingly counterintuitive results.
Ibragimov et al. (2009) demonstrate how this analysis can be used to explain abnormally low
levels of reinsurance among insurance providers in markets for catastrophic insurance. Ibragimov
et al. (2011) show how to analyze the recent financial crisis as a case of excessive risk sharing
between banks when risks are extremely heavy-tailed. Gabaix (2009) provides a survey of empirical
applications in economics and finance.
It follows from the two-risks example above that the limits of diversification results hold for iid
losses regardless of the weights wj used in construction of a diversified portfolio. Therefore, in what
follows we consider an equally weighted portfolio w1 = w2 = 1/2. To state the results formally, let
(ξ1(β), ξ2(β)) denote independent random variables from a power-law distribution with a common
tail index β. The following theorem can be easily extended to any diversified portfolio of size n, in
which case
(
ξ1(α)+ξ2(α)
2
)
in inequalities (2)-(3) is replaced with
∑n
i=1wiξi(α).
Theorem 1 For sufficiently small loss probability q,
VaRq
(ξ1(α) + ξ2(α)
2
)
< VaRq(ξ1(α)), if α > 1 (2)
VaRq
(ξ1(α) + ξ2(α)
2
)
> VaRq(ξ1(α)), if α < 1 (3)
Proof See Appendix for all proofs.
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An interesting boundary case corresponds to α = 1. This is when diversification has no effect
at all, ie it neither increases nor reduces VaR. For example, if ξ’s are iid Stable with α = 1, which
means they have a Cauchy distribution, it is easy to show that
∑n
i=1wiξi(α) is equal in distribution
to ξi(α), so a diversified and a non-diversified portfolios have identical VaRs.
It is not obvious what happens if we relax the independence assumptions. The two extreme
cases, corresponding to a comonotone and countermonotone relationships between the components
do not present a consistent picture. For example if we assume that ξ1 = ξ2 (a.s.) then obviously
VaRq (w1ξ1(α) + w2ξ2(α)) = VaRq(ξ1(α)) and so diversification has no effect regardless of the tails;
while if we assume ξ1 = −ξ2 (a.s.) then VaRq (w1ξ1(α) + w2ξ2(α)) = (w1 − w2)VaRq(ξ(α)) and it
is optimal to fully diversify regardless of the tails.
In the next section we use copulas to allow for arbitrary dependence, which includes the two
extreme cases in the limit.
3 Diversification under dependence
3.1 Dependence and copulas
Copulas are joint distributions with uniform marginals. They are useful because given the
marginal distributions, they represent the dependence in the joint distribution. Specifically, let
H(x1, . . . , xn) and h(x1, . . . , xn) denote the joint distribution and density, respectively, of n random
variables (X1, . . . , Xn) and suppose that the marginal density and cdf of Xj are fj(xj) and Fj(xj)
respectively, j = 1, . . . , n. Then, an n-dimensional copula of (X1, . . . , Xn) is a function C : [0, 1]
n →
[0, 1] such that
(a) C(u1, . . . , un) is increasing in each ui, i = 1, . . . , n.
(b) C(u1, . . . , ui−1, 0, ui+1, . . . , un) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
(c) C(1, . . . , 1, ui, 1, . . . , 1) = ui, i = 1, . . . , n.
(d) for any aj ≤ bj , j = 1, . . . , n,,
2∑
i1=1
· · ·
2∑
in=1
(−1)i1+···+inC(u1i1 , . . . , unin) ≥ 0,
where uj1 = aj and uj2 = bj for all j = 1, . . . , n.
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(e) H(x1, . . . , xn) = C(F1(x1), . . . , Fn(xn)), or, for absolutely continuous copulas with density
c(u1, . . . , un), h(x1, . . . , xn) = c(F1(x1), . . . , Fn(xn))
∏n
i=1 f(xi).
It is well known that c is uniquely determined if Fj is monotone. The probability integral trans-
forms uj = Fj(xj), j = 1, 2, are the uniform random variables that form the marginals of c. So,
equivalently C can be defined as a joint cdf of n random variables, each of which is uniform on
[0, 1]. The fact that we can model Fj separately from modelling the dependence between Fj ’s is
what makes copulas natural in the analysis of dependent power-law marginals.
A well known property of the copula function is that it is bounded by the Frechet-Hoeffding
bounds, which correspond to extreme positive and extreme negative dependence. For a bivariate
copula, let x1 be a fixed increasing function of x2, then the copula of (x1, x2) can be written as
min(u1, u2) and this is the upper bound for bivariate copulas. Now let x1 be a fixed decreasing
function of x2; then the copula of (x1, x2) can be written as max(u1+u2−1, 0). So the two extreme
cases when diversification does not have any effect (comonotonicity) and when it is always beneficial
(countermonotonicity) regardless of the heavy-tailedness are nested within the copula framework.
Joe (1997) and Nelsen (2006) provide excellent introductions to copulas.
If we return to the two-risk example above, we are interested in how the aggregate loss proba-
bility for a diversified portfolio compares to that of a single risk. That is, we are interested in the
behavior of
P
(
X1 +X2
2
> x
)
=
∫ ∫
z1+z2
2
>x
f(z1;α)f(z2;α)c (F (z1;α), F (z2;α); γ) dz1dz2
= E
{
c (F (ξ1;α), F (ξ2;α); γ) I
[
ξ1 + ξ2
2
> x
]}
where c(u1, u2; γ) is a copula density parameterized by γ, f(·;α)’s are power-law marginal densities,
I[·] is the indicator function and ξj ’s are independent copies of Xj ’s. There is no general way to
express this in terms of P(X1 > x) and whether diversification decreases or increases VaR depends
on the copula family as well as on the interaction between α and γ. However, there exist classes of
copulas for which we can make explicit comparisons.
3.2 Power-type copulas
We now discuss a class of copula families which will be used in the paper. The class contains
copulas that are multiplicative or additive in powers of the margins, or can be approximated using
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such copulas. We call this class power-type. It is similar but more general than the power copula
family and than the polynomial copula family which we discuss below.
The most common family in this class is the Eyraud-Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (EFGM) cop-
ula family and its generalizations. The bivariate EFGM copula family can be written as follows
C(u1, u2) = u1u2[1 + γ(1− u1)(1− u2)], (4)
where γ ∈ [−1, 1], and its density has the form c(u1, u2) = 1 + g(u1, u2), where g(u1, u2) is an
expansion by linear functions 1 − 2uj , j = 1, 2. This is a non-comprehensive copula in the sense
that it has a limited range of dependence it can accommodate. For example, Kendall’s τ of an
EFGM copula is restricted to
[−29 , 29].
The multivariate version of the EFGM copula introduced by Cambanis (1977) has the following
form:
C(u1, u2, ..., un) = u1u2...un
[
1 +
n∑
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n
γi1,i2,...,ic(1− ui1)(1− ui2)...(1− uic)
]
, (5)
where −∞ < γi1,i2,...,ic < ∞ are such that
∑n
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n γi1,i2,...,icδi1 · · · δic ≥ −1 for all
δi ∈ [−1, 1], i = 1, . . . , n. This copula family can be viewed as a special case of a wider family of
n-dimensional power copulas introduced by Ibragimov (2009a).
The power copula family can be written as follows
C(u1, . . . , un) = u1u2 · · ·un
[
1 +
n∑
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n
γi1,i2,...,ic(u
l
i1 − ul+1i1 )(uli2 − ul+1i2 )...(ulic − ul+1ic )
]
, (6)
where γi1,i2,...,ic ∈ (−∞,∞) are such that
n∑
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n
|γi1,i2,...,ic | ≤ 1.
This corresponds to using nonlinear rather than linear functions in the expansion of the copula
density function.
Another relevant copula family, of which the EFGM copula in (4) is a special case, is known as
a polynomial copula family (see, e.g., Drouet Mari and Kotz, 2001, p. 74). An order m (m ≥ 4)
polynomial copula can be written as follows:
C(u, v) = uv
1 + k+q≤m−2∑
k≥1,q≥1
γkq(u
k − 1)(vq − 1)
 , (7)
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where γkq =
θkq
(k+1)(q+1) and 0 ≤ min
(∑k+q≤m−2
k≥1,q≥1 qγkq,
∑k+q≤m−2
k≥1,q≥1 kγkq
)
≤ 1.
One example of this copula family is Nelsen et al.’s (1997) copula with cubic section, which is
written as follows
C(u, v) = uv + 2γuv(1− u)(1− v)(1 + u+ v − 2uv), (8)
where γ ∈ [0, 14 ].
Several other copula families can be written as approximations of the EFGM copula. For
example, it is well known that the EFGM copula is a first-order approximation to the Ali-Mikhail-
Haq (AMH) copula family. The AMH copula can be written as follows:
C(u1, . . . , un) = (1− γ)
[
n∏
i=1
(
1− γ
ui
+ γ
)
− γ
]−1
,
where γ ∈ [−1, 1].
A less known result is that the Plackett and the Frank copula families are first order Taylor
approximations of the EFGM copula at independence (see, e.g., Nelsen, 2006, p. 100, 133). The n-
variate Frank copula, which is comprehensive, radially symmetric and Archimedian, can be written
as follows
C(u1, . . . , un) = logγ
[
1 +
∏n
i=1(γ
ui − 1)
(γ − 1)n−1
]
,
where γ ≥ 0.
The n-variate Plackett copula, which is also comprehensive, is rarely discussed in the literature
unless n = 2, in which case it has the following form:
C(u1, u2) =
1
2(γ − 1)
[
1 + (γ − 1)(u1 + u2)−
√
[1 + (θ − 1)(u1 + u2)]2 − 4γ(γ − 1)u1u2
]
,
where 1 6= γ > 0. However, a way to generalize to n > 2 is presented by Molenberghs and Lesaffre
(1994). It is also worth mentioning that for all the three copula families, there exist improved
second-order approximations (see, e.g., Nelsen, 2006, p. 83).
An interesting set of approximation results are given by Nelsen et al. (1997), Cuadras (2009)
and Cuadras and Diaz (2012). Nelsen et al. (1997) provide a generalization of the bivariate EFGM
copula using cubic terms as in (8) and show that it can be used to approximate some well-known
families of copulas, both symmetric and not, such as the copulas of Kimeldorf and Sampson (1975)
and Lin (1987), as well as the Sarmanov copula. They also show that copulas in (8) are second-
degree Maclaurin approximations to members of the Frank and Plackett copula families.
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Cuadras (2009) studies the power series class of copulas, obtained as weighted geometric means
of the EFGM and AMH copulas, and shows that the Gumbel-Barnett and Cuadras-Auge copulas
can be expressed as first-order approximations to that class. Cuadras and Diaz (2012) provide
approximations of the tail-dependent Clayton-Oakes copula, which also have the form of a power-
type generalization of the EFGM copula.
3.3 Diversification under dependence
We start with the bivariate EFGM copula. Let (X1, X2) be random variables with the EFGM
copula and power-law marginals. Then, for any x ≥ 1 and for j = 1, 2,
Fj(x) ∼ 1− x−α,
fj(x) ∼ αx−α−1,
H(x1, x2) = F1(x1)F2(x2)
[
1 + γ(1− F1(x1))(1− F2(x2))
]
,
h(x1, x2) = f1(x1)f2(x2)
[
1 + γ(1− 2F1(x1))(1− 2F2(x2))
]
.
As before, let (ξ1(α), ξ2(α)) be independent random variables from power-law distributions with
tail index α, often called independent copies of (X1, X2). Our key insight is that in the tail, the
behavior of products and powers of power-law densities and distributions of Xj ’s is identical to the
behavior of their independent copies. This makes it possible to provide asymptotic (with respect
to the loss) comparisons between the VaR of the aggregated loss and that of a single risk. More
specifically, the crucial component of P
(
X1+X2
2 > x
)
under the EFGM copula can be written as
follows ∫
s+t
2
>x
α2s−α−1t−α−1(2s−α − 1)(2t−α − 1)dsdt
= 4α2P
(
ξ1(2α) + ξ2(2α)
2
> z
)
− 2α2P
(
ξ1(2α) + ξ2(α)
2
> z
)
−2α2P
(
ξ1(α) + ξ2(2α)
2
> z
)
+ α2P
(
ξ1(α) + ξ2(α)
2
> z
)
,
where the behavior of the individual summands for large z is driven by the lowest tail index of ξj
in the portfolio.
We formalize this result in the following theorem, which generalizes to n dependent heavy-
tailed random variables X1, X2, ..., Xn with multivariate EFGM copula given in (5) and power-law
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marginals.
Theorem 2 For an asymptotically large z > 0, and any n, α > 0,
P
( n∑
i=1
Xi > zn
)
∼ P
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)
. (9)
The result suggests that suboptimality of diversification in the VaR framework for extremely
heavy tailed losses carries over from independence to the EFGM copula. That is, diversification
increases VaR of dependent extremely heavy tailed risks within this copula family. Specifically,
combining the results of Theorems 1 and 2, it is easy to see that the following corollary holds.
Corollary 1 For dependent losses with the EFGM copula and sufficiently small loss probability q,
VaRq
(X1 +X2
2
)
< VaRq(X1), if α > 1 (10)
VaRq
(X1 +X2
2
)
> VaRq(X1), if α < 1 (11)
Another interesting corollary of Theorem 2 can be obtained by combining this result with
Theorem 1 of Sharakhmetov and Ibragimov (2002). The EFGM copula family has restrictive
dependence, for example, it is not comprehensive in the sense that it cannot accommodate all
possible values of Kendall’s τ . Yet, as shown by Sharakhmetov and Ibragimov (2002), it can be
used to represent any joint distribution of two-valued random variables (see also de la Pena et al.,
2006, p. 190). Therefore, for two-valued random variables, our Theorem 2 applies to all dependence
patterns.
Important generalizations of Theorem 2 arise if we consider the wider class of power-type copulas
introduced in Section 3.2. Most popular members of this class such as the polynomial copula of
Drouet Mari and Kotz (2001), the copula with cubic section of Nelsen et al. (1997) and the power
copula of Ibragimov (2009b) can be written in the following general form
C(u1, . . . , un) =
∑
i1,...,in=0,1,...
γi1,i2,...,in · ui11 · ui22 · . . . · uinn , (12)
for a multiple index i = (i1, i2, . . . , in) and a set of corresponding parameters γi with appropriate
restrictions that make C(u1, . . . , un) a copula. For example, Drouet Mari and Kotz (2001, Section
4.5.2) show how to obtain the polynomial copula in (7) from function f = ukvq. The key feature
of such copulas is that they and their densities can be expressed as powers of uj ’s. This allows to
apply similar arguments as for EFGM.
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Theorem 3 For dependent losses with a power-type copula in (12) and for an asymptotically large
z > 0, and any n, α > 0, the conclusions of Theorem 2 hold.
One may argue that the class of copulas in (12) is not sufficiently general. For example, it
is not clear whether it can incorporate tail dependence or comprehensive copulas. However, the
power-type copulas also include copulas which can approximate or be approximated by the class in
(12). And, as discussed in Section 3.2, there are comprehensive and tail-dependent copulas among
these copulas. Our next corollary establishes the result for such approximations.
Corollary 2 For dependent losses with copulas whose Taylor or Maclaurin expansions can be writ-
ten as (12), for an asymptotically large z > 0, and any n, α > 0, the conclusions of Theorem 2 hold
but only locally at the point of approximation.
This corollary covers all the copula families discussed in Section 3.2 including the AMH, Plack-
ett, Frank, Clayton-Oakes, Kimeldorf and Sampson, Lin, Gumbel-Barnett and many others, but
only to the extent the approximations are valid. That is, the results of Theorem 2 hold for ex-
pansions at the point at which we expand, which often coincides with independence. Clearly, they
do not have to hold when the approximation error is large. Therefore, applicability of Theorem
2 to a specific copula family needs to be checked on a case-by-case basis but the class of copulas
to which it can be potentially applied is quite rich – it includes comprehensive copulas (Plackett,
Frank), asymmetric copulas (Nelsen et al.’s copulas with cubic sections) and tail-dependent copulas
(Clayton-Oakes).
3.4 Simulations
The results so far have been asymptotic with respect to the loss, that is they are valid as q → 0.
The interesting values of q used in practice are 0.01 and 0.05, which are non-asymptotic. This
section uses simulations to study the tail behavior of VaR at non-asymptotic levels q using selected
copula families.
The setup of the simulations is as follows. We generate equally weighted two-asset portfolios
using losses X1 and X2, which have heavy tailed marginals with tail index α, ranging between 0
and 10, and a copula with dependence parameter γ, ranging between a high negative and a high
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positive dependence. We then calculate the ratio VaRq
(
(X1+X2)/2
)
/VaRq(X1) for q = 0.05 across
various values of dependence parameter and tail index. For the fixed non-asymptotic level of loss
probability, the ratio demonstrates whether the effect of diversification is susceptible to changes in
the copula parameter and the degree of heavy-tailedness, as well as to non-infinite losses. If the
ratio is greater than one, this is an indication of diversification failure.
Table 1 reports the results for selected copulas. The simulations are based on 1,000,000 draws.
The copulas we report include tail-dependent, asymmetric, Archimedian and comprehensive cop-
ulas, both power-type (eg EFGM) and not (eg Gaussian). Perhaps surprisingly, the table seems
to present a very consistent picture across all these copula families, not only power-type. The
threshold value of α at which we observe the reversal of the diversification benefit is close to one –
for most values of θ, the reversal happens between α = 1 and α = 1.2, suggesting that even under
infinite moments of a fractional order above one, diversification increases riskiness.
Under extreme positive dependence, as expected we observe that diversification has no effect at
all. This of course can only be seen under comprehensive copulas, which allow for comonotonicity.
Under extreme negative dependence, we observe the expected result that diversification always
works but we observe it only for the Frank copulas, which is surprising. Under independence,
the reversal happens at the same threshold value of α as for dependence which agrees with our
main results. It is also worth mentioning that the positive effect of diversification where it exists
is relatively small – the risk is reduced by no more than 20% – while if diversification fails it fails
spectacularly, with VaR increasing by tens and hundreds percent.
4 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the limits of diversification for dependent risks. The revisit focused on a
wide class of copulas that are additive in powers of margins. This class covers some well known
families such as EFGM, power and polynomial families but also contains a number of other copula
classes which do not have this form but can be approximated using Taylor-type expansions. So the
resulting class we consider is very wide – comprehensive, tail-dependent and asymmetric copula
families can be considered within this class.
The main result of the paper is that within the class, diversification increases riskiness in a VaR
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framework if the power index of the individual risks falls below one. This makes dependent risks
within this class no different from independent in the sense that the same threshold value of the
tail index delineates the benefits of diversification.
We have looked at equally weighted portfolios with components having the same tail index.
The restriction of equal tail indices can easily be relaxed because the tail behavior of the aggregate
loss will be dominated by the component with the lowest tail index. The limits of diversification
are determined by whether the lowest index in the portfolio is above or below one. A similar result
can be shown for unequally weighted portfolios but we leave both these extensions for future work.
We have also looked at simulation-based results where losses are given more realistic, non-
asymptotic, values and have confirmed that diversification stops being beneficial at a threshold
value of tail index which is somewhat greater than one. The discrepancy is due to the finite losses
and it vanishes as q → 0. However, the fact that the threshold is so much higher than one for copulas
other than Archimedian and that the same threshold applies even to non-power-type copulas are
of independent interest.
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Table 1: VaR of a portfolio to VaR of a single loss for selected copulas
θ\α 0.2 0.4 0.7 1 1.2 1.6 2 3 4 7 10
Gaussian
-1 15.353 2.814 1.348 1.029 0.938 0.848 0.818 0.816 0.832 0.878 0.908
-0.7 15.732 2.849 1.362 1.034 0.943 0.855 0.828 0.827 0.844 0.887 0.914
-0.4 15.324 2.803 1.360 1.055 0.955 0.883 0.858 0.852 0.867 0.905 0.929
0 14.815 2.792 1.378 1.088 1.001 0.928 0.904 0.897 0.904 0.932 0.948
0.2 13.583 2.646 1.382 1.106 1.019 0.956 0.931 0.919 0.926 0.945 0.958
0.5 9.852 2.346 1.317 1.101 1.028 0.984 0.960 0.952 0.953 0.967 0.974
0.7 6.419 1.952 1.243 1.082 1.036 0.996 0.980 0.970 0.971 0.980 0.984
0.9 2.854 1.391 1.111 1.041 1.016 1.004 0.994 0.990 0.991 0.993 0.995
1 1.003 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Student-t (v = 5)
-1 15.803 2.792 1.348 1.028 0.933 0.845 0.819 0.816 0.833 0.878 0.907
-0.7 16.222 2.797 1.361 1.034 0.943 0.863 0.835 0.828 0.847 0.890 0.916
-0.4 14.966 2.784 1.379 1.043 0.965 0.883 0.859 0.856 0.870 0.907 0.929
0 12.682 2.541 1.345 1.062 0.994 0.925 0.901 0.894 0.902 0.930 0.947
0.2 10.965 2.434 1.320 1.067 1.002 0.937 0.919 0.914 0.922 0.943 0.957
0.5 7.328 2.067 1.249 1.061 1.013 0.966 0.949 0.942 0.948 0.963 0.973
0.7 4.905 1.717 1.180 1.050 1.014 0.978 0.969 0.966 0.968 0.977 0.983
0.9 2.369 1.292 1.075 1.017 1.007 0.994 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.992 0.994
1 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Frank
-3000 0.500 0.500 0.503 0.513 0.524 0.550 0.580 0.647 0.700 0.796 0.847
0.25 14.519 2.822 1.370 1.057 1.009 0.940 0.895 0.901 0.909 0.936 0.949
0.5 15.940 2.801 1.387 1.079 1.023 0.935 0.919 0.905 0.911 0.934 0.951
1 13.606 2.796 1.403 1.077 1.016 0.948 0.931 0.918 0.926 0.940 0.955
2 15.148 2.643 1.407 1.124 1.054 0.982 0.950 0.931 0.938 0.955 0.963
5 12.343 2.589 1.424 1.151 1.095 1.005 0.993 0.978 0.971 0.976 0.984
20 5.833 1.928 1.340 1.162 1.106 1.064 1.047 1.020 1.017 1.005 1.004
100 1.409 1.134 1.045 1.021 1.024 1.017 1.007 1.005 1.003 1.002 1.001
3000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Gumbel
1 15.188 2.910 1.397 1.073 0.999 0.935 0.900 0.897 0.912 0.931 0.948
1.25 7.715 1.988 1.230 1.045 0.994 0.943 0.929 0.926 0.939 0.953 0.966
1.5 4.950 1.802 1.147 1.020 0.998 0.945 0.948 0.946 0.955 0.969 0.978
2 3.136 1.379 1.076 1.013 0.969 0.970 0.970 0.973 0.976 0.985 0.988
5 1.293 1.084 1.011 1.008 0.996 1.002 0.993 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.999
20 1.006 1.003 1.004 0.998 1.003 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 1.008 0.999 0.998 1.000 1.001 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
500 1.001 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
3000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 1 (Cont’d): VaR of a portfolio to VaR of a single loss for selected copulas
θ\α 0.2 0.4 0.7 1 1.2 1.6 2 3 4 7 10
Clayton
0 16.542 2.838 1.356 1.085 1.011 0.920 0.900 0.895 0.903 0.932 0.949
0.25 10.263 2.529 1.331 1.089 1.022 0.948 0.933 0.919 0.926 0.947 0.959
0.5 7.473 1.963 1.249 1.052 1.005 0.958 0.940 0.934 0.946 0.958 0.968
1 3.985 1.582 1.105 1.004 0.989 0.959 0.959 0.962 0.962 0.978 0.982
2 1.999 1.200 1.048 0.997 0.989 0.982 0.975 0.982 0.991 0.992 0.992
5 1.306 1.053 1.021 0.993 1.000 0.994 0.993 0.996 0.997 0.998 0.998
20 1.007 1.004 1.004 0.997 0.998 0.998 1.001 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000
100 1.005 1.006 1.000 1.002 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000
3000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
EFGM
-1 15.813 2.922 1.389 1.072 0.979 0.888 0.866 0.866 0.877 0.909 0.933
-0.7 17.016 2.813 1.335 1.082 0.966 0.909 0.869 0.876 0.885 0.914 0.936
-0.4 16.000 2.715 1.333 1.066 0.975 0.908 0.887 0.885 0.890 0.923 0.941
0 15.312 2.856 1.368 1.098 0.997 0.932 0.902 0.903 0.904 0.932 0.948
0.2 15.889 2.747 1.378 1.086 1.014 0.947 0.912 0.907 0.914 0.936 0.951
0.5 14.504 2.916 1.383 1.121 1.034 0.945 0.920 0.912 0.922 0.943 0.958
0.7 13.526 2.728 1.359 1.116 1.035 0.955 0.932 0.930 0.930 0.947 0.963
0.9 13.667 2.794 1.403 1.132 1.021 0.966 0.950 0.931 0.933 0.951 0.961
1 14.245 2.733 1.427 1.132 1.044 0.979 0.947 0.931 0.938 0.952 0.967
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
This follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 of Ibragimov (2009b)
Proof of Theorem 2
We start with the case n = 2. Due to independence between ξ1 and ξ2, we have that
P
(ξ1(β1) + ξ2(β2)
2
> z
)
= β1β2
∫
s+t
2
>z
s−β1−1t−β2−1dsdt. (13)
Now for non-independent (X1, X2) under the EFGM copula, we can write using (13):
P
(X1 +X2
2
> z
)
=
∫
s+t
2
>z
f1(s)f2(t)
[
1 + γ(1− 2F1(s))(1− 2F2(t))
]
dsdt
= P
(ξ1(α) + ξ2(α)
2
> z
)
+γ
∫
s+t
2
>z
f1(s)f2(t)(1− 2F1(s))(1− 2F2(t))dsdt
= P
(ξ1(α) + ξ2(α)
2
> z
)
+γE(1− 2F1(ξ))(1− 2F2(η))I
(ξ1 + ξ2
2
> z
)
,
where I(·) denotes the indicator function.
Now consider the last term:∫
s+t
2
>z
f1(s)f2(t)(1− 2F1(s))(1− 2F2(t))dsdt =
∫
s+t
2
>z
α2s−α−1t−α−1(2s−α − 1)(2t−α − 1)dsdt
= 4α2
∫
s+t
2
>z
s−2α−1t−2α−1dsdt
−2α2
∫
s+t
2
>z
s−2α−1t−α−1dsdt
−2α2
∫
s+t
2
>z
s−α−1t−2α−1dsdt
+α2
∫
s+t
2
>z
s−α−1t−α−1dsdt
= 4α2I1 − 2α2I2 − 2α2I3 + α2I4,
where I1 = P
(
ξ1(2α)+ξ2(2α)
2 > z
)
, I2 = P
(
ξ1(2α)+ξ2(α)
2 > z
)
, I3 = P
(
ξ1(α)+ξ2(2α)
2 > z
)
and
I4 = P
(
ξ1(α)+ξ2(α)
2 > z
)
.
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Thus we obtain
P
(X + Y
2
> z
)
= (1 + γα2)P
(ξ1(α) + ξ2(α)
2
> z
)
−2γα2P
(ξ1(α) + ξ2(2α)
2
> z
)
−2γα2P
(ξ1(2α) + ξ2(α)
2
> z
)
+4γα2P
(ξ1(2α) + ξ2(2α)
2
> z
)
.
It is a well-known result in the power law literature (see, among others, Corollary 1.3.2 in
Embrechts et al., 1997) that, asymptotically as z →∞,
P
(ξ1(β) + ξ2(β)
2
> z
)
∼ 2P(ξ1(β) > 2z) ∼ 21−βz−β (14)
for all β > 0. In addition, if β1 < β2, then
P
(ξ1(β1) + ξ2(β2)
2
> z
)
∼ P(ξ1(β1) > 2z) ∼ 2−β1z−β1 (15)
It follows from (14)-(15) that, as z →∞,
P
(X + Y
2
> z
)
∼ (1 + γα2)21−αz−α − 2γα221−αz−α + 4γα221−2αz−2α (16)
∼ (1− γα2)21−αz−α
∼ P
(ξ1(α) + ξ2(α)
2
> z
)
.
We now provide a generalization for any n. Let X1, X2, ..., Xn have a multidimensional EFGM
copula
C(u1, u2, ..., un) = u1u2...un
[
1 +
n∑
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n
γi1,i2,...,ic(1− ui1)(1− ui2)...(1− uic)
]
, (17)
where γi1,i2,...,ic are real constants satisfying certain inequalities that guarantee that (17) represents
a proper copula.
Let X1, X2, ..., Xn have power law distributions with the same parameter α > 0. It follows from
(17) that the joint cdf of X1, X2, ..., Xn has the form
F (x1, x2, ..., xn) = F1(x1)F2(x2)...Fn(xn)
×
[
1 +
n∑
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n
γi1,i2,...,ic(1− Fi1(xi1))(1− Fi2(xi2))...(1− Fic(xic))
]
,
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Let, ξ1(β1), ξ2(β2), ..., ξn(βn) denote the independent random variables with power law distri-
butions with tail indices β1, β2, ..., βn, respectively. That is,
P(ξi(βi) > x) = x−βi , (18)
x ≥ 1, i = 1, 2, ..., n,. In particular, ξ1(α), ξ2(α), ...., ξn(α) are independent copies of X1, X2, ..., Xn.
Then, it follows that
P
( n∑
i=1
Xi > zn
)
= P
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)
(19)
+
n∑
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n
γi1,i2,...,ic
×E
[(
1− 2Fi1(ξi1(α))
)(
1− 2Fi2(ξi2(α))
)
...
(
1− 2Fic(ξic(α))
)
I
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)]
.
Thus, since the random variables ξ1(α), ξ(α), ..., ξn(α) are i.i.d.,
P
( n∑
i=1
Xi > zn
)
= P
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)
(20)
+
( n∑
c=2
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ic≤n
γi1,i2,...,ic
)
×E
[(
1− 2F1(ξ1(α))
)(
1− 2F2(ξ2(α))
)
...
(
1− 2Fc(ξc(α))
)
I
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)]
.
Now consider the last term
E
[(
1− 2F1(ξ1(α))
)(
1− 2F2(ξ2(α))
)
...
(
1− 2Fc(ξc(α))
)
I
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)]
(21)
=
c∑
s=0
∑
1≤j1<j2<...<js≤c
(−1)c−s
∫
∑n
i=1 xi>zn
∏
k∈{j1,j2,...,js}
(2α)x−2α−1k
×
∏
k∈{1,2,...,n}\{j1,j2,...,js}
αx−α−1k dx1dx2...dxn
=
c∑
s=0
∑
1≤j1<j2<...<js≤c
(−1)c−sP
( ∑
k∈{j1,j2,...,js}
ξk(2α) +
∑
k∈{1,2,...,n}\{j1,j2,...,js}
ξk(α) > z
)
,
where 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < ... < js ≤ c, s = 0, 1, ..., c, c = 2, ..., n, (s, c) 6= (n, n) (and, thus, (j1, j2, ..., jc)
is different from (1, 2, ..., n)).
Consequently, for large z, we obtain
P
( ∑
k∈{j1,j2,...,js}
ξk(2α) +
∑
k∈{1,2,...,n}\{j1,j2,...,js}
ξk(α) > z
)
∼ P
( ∑
k∈{1,2,...,n}\{j1,j2,...,js}
ξk(α) > zn
)
.(22)
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In addition, by Corollary 1.3.2 of Embrechts et al. (1997), we have, for large z > 0,
P
( ∑
k∈{1,2,...,n}\{j1,j2,...,js}
ξk(α) > z
)
∼ (n− s)P(ξ1(α) > zn) ∼ n− s
zαnα
. (23)
So, for for s = c = n, (j1, j2, ..., jn) = (1, 2, ..., n),
P
( n∑
k=1
ξk(2α) > zn
)
∼ nP(ξ1(2α) > zn) ∼ n
z2αn2α
. (24)
From (21)-(24) it follows that, with 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < ... < js ≤ c, s = 0, 1, ..., c, c = 2, ..., n,
(s, c) 6= (n, n),
E
[(
1− 2F1(ξ1(α))
)(
1− 2F2(ξ2(α))
)
...
(
1− 2Fc(ξc(α))
)
I
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)]
∼
c∑
s=0
∑
1≤j1<j2<...<js≤c
(−1)c−sn− s
zαnα
=
( c∑
s=0
(−1)c−sCsc
)
z−αn1−α −
( c∑
s=0
(−1)c−ssCsc
)
z−αn−α, (25)
where Csc = c!/(s!(c− s)!) denotes binomial coefficients.
Now, by the well-known identity for binomial coefficients,
c∑
s=0
(−1)c−sCsc =
c∑
s=0
(−1)sCsc = 0, (26)
c∑
s=0
(−1)c−ssCsc = c
c∑
s=1
(−1)c−sCs−1c−1 = −c
c−1∑
s=0
(−1)c−1−sCsc−1 = 0. (27)
It thus follows that P (
∑n
i=1Xi > zn) ∼ P (
∑n
i=1 ξi(α) > zn) .
Proof of Corollary 1
The result follows trivially by inversion of the cdfs in Theorem 2 for n = 2 and applying
equations (2)-(3).
Proof of Theorem 3
The density corresponding to (12) is a polynomial of a lower order, which we write in the
following generic form:
c(u1, . . . , un) =
∑
k1,...,kn=0,1,...
φk1,k2,...,kn · uk11 · uk22 · . . . · uknn , (28)
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Then, using arguments similar to Theorem 2,
P
( n∑
i=1
Xi > zn
)
= E
[ ∑
ki∈{0,1,...}
φk1,k2,...,kn (29)
×F k11 (ξ1(α))F k22 (ξ2(α))...F knn (ξn(α))I
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)]
= P
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)
+ E
[ ∑
ki∈{0,1,...}\{ki=0∀i}
φk1,k2,...,kn (30)
×F k11 (ξ1(α))F k22 (ξ2(α))...F knn (ξn(α))I
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)]
.
Now consider the last term.
E
[ ∑
ki∈{0,1,...}\{ki=0∀i}
φk1,k2,...,knF
k1
1 (ξ1(α))F
k2
2 (ξ2(α))...F
kn
n (ξn(α))I
( n∑
i=1
ξi(α) > zn
)]
(31)
=
∫
∑n
i=1 si>nz
∑
ki∈{0,1,...}
ψk1,k2,...,kns
−α(k1+1)
1 s
−α(k2+1)
2 . . . s
−α(kn+1)
n ds1 . . . dsn
=
∑
ki∈{0,1,...}
ψk1,k2,...,kn
∫
∑n
i=1 si>nz
s
−α(k1+1)
1 s
−α(k2+1)
2 . . . s
−α(kn+1)
n ds1 . . . dsn
=
∑
ki∈{0,1,...}
ψk1,k2,...,knP
(
ξ1(α(k1 + 1)) + . . .+ ξn(α(kn + 1))
n
> z
)
,
where the new coefficients ψ’s are different from φ’s because we have expressed (1−s−αi )ki in terms
of powers of sαi . Now, using the same arguments as for (14)-(15),
P
(ξ1(α) + . . .+ ξn(α)
n
> z
)
∼ nP(ξ1(α) > nz) ∼ n1−αz−α
P
(
ξ1(α(k1 + 1)) + . . .+ ξn(α(kn + 1))
n
> z
)
∼ P(ξ1(α) > nz) ∼ n−αz−α,
for all ki ≥ 0. It thus follows that P (
∑n
i=1Xi > zn) ∼ P (
∑n
i=1 ξi(α) > zn) .
Proof of Corollary 2
Clearly if a copula has a Taylor expansion of the form (12) in a neighborhood of a point, the
validity of Theorem 2 will be limited to that neighborhood.
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